China's Leverage Forces Everyone to Redraw Their Supply Maps
What is at stake with the deadline is less the volumes involved than the legal reach of the mechanism. Whether China extends the suspension or reactivates its extraterritoriality clause, with its 0.1% threshold for Chinese-origin rare earths in imported components, will have immediate repercussions for the global technology industry (cfr.org; epthinktank.eu). With such a threshold, dependence is no longer measured by where an ore comes from but by the composition of each finished product, which extends Beijing's leverage far beyond its own borders.
Responses are taking shape accordingly. On 30 October 2026, the European Commission and the Canadian government took a further step under their "Alliance for the Future", including an agreement with the European Investment Bank to boost investment in critical raw materials and a digital trade agreement supplementing CETA. The two partners are thereby deepening their cooperation on defence and critical raw materials amid uncertainty surrounding the US administration. The same logic is at work in Asia: Malaysia is signing a growing number of bilateral agreements with the United States and Japan to secure critical minerals. In Argentina, Javier Milei visited Rio Tinto's plant in Catamarca on 28 October 2026, confirming a pro-mining shift.
On the European side, the selection of 46 new strategic projects under the second CRMA call, spanning extraction through to recycling, and Friedrich Merz's call for European strategic stockpiles to guard against a Beijing-induced supply disruption reflect the same anticipation. What matters about these decisions here is the signal they send to external partners: they broaden the demand directed at producer countries which, from Kuala Lumpur to Buenos Aires, are seeking to capture the capital flowing from this diversification.
Beijing and Moscow Pitch Sovereignty to Producers, but the Ground Tells a Different Story
In the face of this race, China and Russia are appealing directly to African producer countries in the language of sovereignty. China's ambassador to Nigeria, Yu Dunhai, set out the four-point proposal put forward by Xi Jinping on 13 October 2026 during his meeting with Botswana's President Duma Gideon Boko, centred on African resource sovereignty and the fight against illegal mining. At the third Russia-Africa summit on 28 October 2026, Vladimir Putin denounced "neocolonialism" and the debt burden imposed by Western countries, while highlighting the volume of Russian agricultural exports to Africa.
China's narrative, however, is contradicted by the facts documented in this briefing. On 23 October 2026, the EFCC arrested 14 Chinese nationals and one Nigerian in Ogere, Ogun State, who were illegally operating four clandestine lithium processing plants. In South Africa, the Living Limpopo coalition is challenging Chinese mining and industrial expansion projects in the Vhembe Biosphere Reserve, citing serious risks to water and the environment. In Mozambique, blogger Albino Sibia was shot dead on 12 December 2024 while livestreaming an exposé of the opaque road traffic in chrome between South Africa and the port of Maputo, bound for China. The rhetoric of resource sovereignty is therefore being tested by the conduct of actors on the ground, and it is there that its credibility will be judged.
The Social Licence to Operate Becomes the Real Variable in Supply Security
Wherever this briefing documents a rush, it also documents resistance. In Pahang State, the Indigenous Semai people are opposing the rare-earths rush at the very moment their government is signing agreements with Washington and Tokyo. In Mhondoro-Ngezi, Zimbabwe, communities living alongside the platinum industry, including Unki Platinum Mine, are denouncing the lack of roads, schools and access to water, as well as environmental problems caused by mine effluent. In Argentina, Javier Milei's mining gamble is being criticised for its limited real impact on the economy. Europe itself is not immune: MEPs and member states disagree over how to handle "NIMBY" opposition and local consultation, which is slowing the harmonisation of permitting.
Where the state retreats, the armed economy moves in. In Nasarawa State, the heart of Nigeria's lithium sector, artisanal miners work in precarious conditions, while pollution, governance gaps, flawed community agreements and insecurity driven by armed groups prevent local communities from reaping the benefits. In eastern DRC, Joseph Kabila formally launched the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation in Goma on 13 October 2026, in alliance with the M23, which threatens to derail the peace talks scheduled in Qatar, while the opposition has renewed its call for a national dialogue. No partnership agreement can protect a corridor controlled by an armed group.
Rule-setting bodies are trying to bridge this gap. The EITI is pushing for greater centralisation and transparency in the award of permits. At COP17 in Yerevan, the IGF held a high-level event on the trade-offs between transition minerals and biodiversity. One analysis warns against the trap of criminalising artisanal mining in a context of regulatory and security failures by states. For companies, the implication is clear: diversification agreed between governments is only worth something if projects secure, on the ground, a legitimacy that neither summits nor stockpiles can guarantee.
In Brief
- South Africa's 4.9% GDP revision now officially incorporates informal and illegal mining.
- In Nigeria's Zamfara State, armed bandits are carrying out reprisal attacks on gold-mining sites and military bases.
- Armenia, host of COP17, faces intense environmental criticism following the opening of the Amulsar gold mine.
What to Watch
- 09/11 to 20/11/2026: COP31 in Antalya, where discussions will cover setting a target of 35% electricity in the energy mix by 2035 and the implementation of the energy transition, which drives demand for critical minerals.
- 10/11/2026: expiry of China's suspension of export controls on rare earths, graphite and battery technologies (Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 70).
- 18/11 to 19/11/2026: 33rd APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Shenzhen, the first political test of the US-China trade truce after the deadline.
- 24/11/2026: deadline for adoption of the EU implementing regulation on permanent magnet labelling (Article 28 of the CRMA).
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